





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


<sup>2</sup> But, as the findings below illustrate, the Turkish press

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protected because political elites (including the media elites) lack a consensus on pluralistic democracy.



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produces an impressive amount of open and critical discussion on a wide variety of subjects related to democratization.

5 One would expect all these self-critical and reflective discussions to produce some movement toward an elite consensus at least on some issues regarding pluralistic democracy over the years. Did this occur? Can it be that there is some consensus on pluralistic democracy but the emergence of more cooperation to promote it is prevented by value clashes on specific issues (in recent years allegedly a religious-secular cleavage)? If neither is true, how could one claim that the press matters, i.e. plays a leading (or autonomous) role?

10 In order to address such questions, this article presents and discusses some of the findings of a systematic and comparative content analysis of three religious-conservative and two pro-secular newspapers in Turkey. A critical period for Turkey's democratization, the years between 1996 and 2004 are covered. In interpreting the findings, the article also draws on historical event analysis and unstructured, complementary interviews with journalists. Specifically, two interrelated questions are investigated:

- 20 (i) which issues divide the Turkish media elites, on which issues is there more convergence of rhetoric, beliefs and values, and how much pluralism does exist within each newspaper?
- (ii) To what extent and how did elite thinking change on critical issues and what kind of a relationship does seem to exist between any such changes and democratic development?

25 These questions have been a vivid part of Turkey's experience with democratization in recent years. Fierce media battles occurred between the government's supporters and skeptics in the media on the one hand, and between the government and the skeptical media on the other hand. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) was established by splitting from an earlier political Islamist party. During the 2000s, it transformed itself into a mass party with, using the party's own definition, a "conservative democratic" ideology. During the media battles, the pro-government elites portrayed themselves as the defenders of democratization against the beneficiaries of the military-bureaucratic guardian state. The latter, they charged, protected the "semi-democratic" status quo by using secularism as a pretext with the help of the "secularist" media elite. In turn, the skeptics together with opposition parties such as the pro-secular Republican People's Party (CHP) portrayed themselves as the defenders of secularism, secular democracy, or Atatürk's legacy of secular modernization. The AKP's policies and reforms, they charged, were not really aimed at democratization but at solidifying the party's majority rule and the country's gradual Islamization, with the help of the pro-government (and its) media.

40 While each side put most of the blame on the other, both sides seemed to agree that the media lacked consensus on democratic values and a categorical commitment to pluralistic democracy for all. Extant research on Turkish media tends to

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Many charges regarding illegitimate media interference with politics are difficult to test empirically because media power can be used in subtle ways and motivations behind them are hard to infer. For example, it is almost impossible for scholars to infer what motivates a newspaper to publish reports implicating a government in corruption cases. Is it the media's role as watchdog of politics or the specific (economic or ideological) interests of the newspaper publishing these reports? Sometimes, it is both. Corrupt linkages between politicians and the media owners exist, and often result in the latter's exercise of power over editors, journalists, and the content of reporting in exchange for economic and political privileges. Some of such biased reporting regarding specific events and daily politics may possibly be tested through content analysis coupled with historical event analysis. Interviews with journalists provide important insights. But such interference of the press with daily politics, and vice versa, is outside the scope of this article.

#### Media and Political Development

The object of analysis here is more specific: the discussions that take place in the media on long-term questions and subjects (such as democratization, secularism, ethnic-religious diversity, and the image of the West) and how the changes that may occur in the elite thinking (i.e. rhetoric, beliefs, and values) as a result of these discussions affect political development over time. Insofar as changes in the predominant beliefs and values in the media can plausibly be linked to subsequent political developments, examining the press as a measure of political development is justified, just like Yalman recommends.

There are three potential ways or causal mechanisms through which media can affect values and political development:

- (i) by shaping the public values and preferences;
- (ii) by reflecting elite thinking; and
- (iii) by serving as a site for the formation (change or maintenance) of elite thinking.

The focus in this article is on the latter two links. Various reasons can be cited to explain why the media's primary role during democratization may be as a site of elite discussion, contention, and preference formation.

There are many *a priori*

media to tailor their coverage to the preferences of their audience.<sup>8</sup> Whenever the public is divided on complex issues, journalists with expert knowledge may have more ability to influence, but not dominate, the public opinion on these issues of controversy.<sup>10</sup> Yet, it is hard to claim that experts, who are more ideologically committed than general public, are necessarily wiser than the masses.<sup>11</sup> Thus, many people may intuitively distrust experts' judgment and rely on their own, even with regard to complicated issues that require specific knowledge to comprehend.

In Turkey, the media's potential effects on the public opinion may be diminished by levels of literacy and education that lag behind per capita income, and the public's relatively low trust in the media.<sup>12</sup> The lack of mass newspapers in the

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can also aim to uncover the meanings that the authors of the texts intended to convey, which may require the analyst to read multiple texts written by the same author and to investigate each author's personal and intellectual history. The price is that one loses in the degree to which the information obtained is generalizable and testable, and in the degree to which the method used by the analyst is transparent. The inference made is likely to be specific to a small number of texts, as examining the hidden meaning in a text requires multiple, "deep" or thorough readings of the text possibly coupled with ethnographic research. Since such readings are also likely to be made by one scholar, the information obtained tends to depend on that particular analyst's interpretations. 10

By comparison, targeting the manifest meaning makes it possible to cover a much larger number of texts. The information becomes more generalizable and reliable because the analysis covers a large number of texts and because the inferences will depend on the interpretations of a much larger number of analysts working with the same rules and definitions. For some inferences computer software can also be used. The rules and definitions the analysts work with should be transparent so that their findings can be comparable. However, the price is that the information obtained will be thinner in the sense that this type of analysis has less potential to uncover the whole, implicit, or dominant meanings of the texts, or the implicit intentions of the authors. For example, it can infer direct or explicit criticisms or commendations of a worldview such as liberalism, but cannot detect indirect or implicit criticisms. It can detect that a text includes ideas that are both favoring and opposing a policy, but cannot necessarily infer which ones dominate the text. It cannot infer whether or not the text itself, or the author's worldview, is coherent.

The second tradeoff is between targeting what can be called positive inference and normative inference. Positive inference refers to, for example, how terminology changes by examining the frequency with which a certain codeword is employed in text, how popular a subject is by examining the frequency with which a certain subject category is openly discussed, or how frequently a certain syntax of words is used. Normative inference covers normative values employed and judgments made in texts with respect to groups, subjects, and social, political and economic questions.

Targeting the positive inference facilitates the analysis and diminishes its cost: the research can be completed with a smaller team of analysts, by using computer software, and within a shorter period of time. Targeting the normative inference increases the cost of research but enables one to gain more insight. In general, manual analyses can make normative inference more effectively but at a higher cost than computer software. The development of efficient content analysis software requires the resolution of many language-specific problems; as of the writing of this article, software for Turkish texts was in the process of development. 40

In terms of these tradeoffs, the method used in the content analysis here was designed to make both positive and normative inferences regarding manifest meanings. The sample of newspapers was kept as large and representative as possible. A team of twenty analysts (coders) analyzed the contents of these newspapers in

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Istanbul and Ankara libraries between April 2007 and December 2008. In about

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examined roughly 1200 randomly selected articles from the target newspapers and identified subjects, ideas, and questions the newspapers discussed. This improved the validity of the subject categories coded in the actual analysis. These categories were then merged with the deductively derived ones in order to create the actual tables that listed all the different subjects, ideas, views and value judgments, and code words which the analysts coded while creating a profile of the contents of each newspaper.

Before the second, main part of the analysis, twenty analysts were recruited through interviews aimed at excluding individuals strongly opinionated on the issue of religion, secularism and democracy. They were then given a one-week long training during which they were taught, for example, according to which definition they were supposed to decide whether or not an article was related to the subject category 'electoral democracy'.

With a view to maximize inter-coder reliability, test analyses were conducted during the training: the trainees examined the same articles and discussed each other's codings with regard to consistency and whether or not they employed the same rules and definitions. These analysts then content analyzed the printed copies of the newspaper issues assigned to them. During the actual analysis, analysts coded articles independently but random checks were conducted to check for coherence and compliance with the rules.

The third part of the analysis comprised the compilation, comparative analysis and interpretation of the findings. During this period, unstructured, in-depth interviews were conducted with journalists.

While interpreting the findings, the objective was to compare newspapers and to identify the findings that indicated change, or lack of change, over time, in a given social-political context. In content analyses, absolute frequencies are difficult to interpret; for example, in an advanced democracy, references to democracy may be lower than in a less developed democracy because democracy is an undisputed norm in the former.<sup>35</sup> But in another context, lack of any reference may have another meaning: censorship or weak support for democracy.

Thus, the interpretation of the findings was concentrated on changing frequencies given the context. An increasing frequency of positive talk about democracy within a newspaper was interpreted to indicate a rising interest in, and positive value change on, democracy. Across newspapers, if more positive references to democracy were found in one than in another, this was interpreted as a sign that pro-democracy value change was occurring in the former newspaper, without necessarily making any inference regarding the latter. Across comparable subjects, a high number of codings in one category compared to another was interpreted as an indication of interest in, and controversy about, the former subject.

Inferences were made about unchanging, or patently low, frequencies of a discussion (i.e. silence) only when the social-political context strongly indicated the need for deliberation on a certain subject. In this case, lack of open deliberation was interpreted as a potential problem. For example, low frequency of talk about any measures against future earthquakes in a society frequently struck by earthquakes that cause heavy damage due to poor building codes would indicate a potential problem.

Finally, combined with historical event analysis, changing frequencies of codings helped to explain why (in response to which events) and how (through which discussions) actors changed their views. Since the findings made sense in their historical context, this also suggested that the content analysis was conducted appropriately and made valid inferences.

#### Is There A Consensus On Pluralistic (Political) Democracy?

There is considerable elite consensus on the overall value of democracy as an ideal, and on the desirability of its liberal, pluralistic kind. As discussed below, the problems lie in the issues of trust that seem to result from value gaps on other issues, and deficits in applying pluralistic-democratic principles to specific problems and groups other than one's own. As a goal in itself, however, democracy is valued by both groups. Over nine years, ideas pertaining to democracy were coded 10,331 times. Only a minority—10.4 and 5.8 percent in the religious and secular press respectively—were negative ideas on democracy discussing any flaws or weaknesses.

There is also consensus on the general value of liberal democracy. Religious elites' support of liberal democracy (71 percent of codings) converged on a similar value as secular elite support of liberal democracy (73 percent). To distinguish it from basic, electoral democracy, liberal democracy was defined for the analysts as the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its features such as freedoms, human rights, rule of law, and minority rights.

Elites also viewed liberal democracy as an insurance of themselves and their ideological interests. The idea that liberal democracy is a means for Muslims to protect themselves through rights and freedoms was approved in the religious press 232 times (83 percent of all the times this idea was coded). Similarly, the idea of liberal democracy as a system protecting and insuring universal rights and freedoms, secularism and the seculars was approved 828 times, or 85 percent of all the codings of this idea in the secular press.

#### The Transformation of Turkish Islamism

A major source of this convergence is the value transformation of political Islamism, which had long been seen as an authoritarian and anti-systemic force in Turkish democracy.<sup>40</sup> A simple sign of this transformation is the evaluation of democracy, especially liberal democracy. Positive ideas on electoral democracy increased in the religious press from 65 percent (872 codings) in the 1996–1999 period to 71 percent (428 codings) in the 2001–2004 period.<sup>41</sup>

(1147 codings) and three percent negative (54 codings) in the 1996–1999 period and 72 percent positive (763 codings) and five percent negative (49 codings) in the 2001–2004 period.

The findings indicate that there was a lively debate on democracy in the religious press, which is reflected by the high number of codings in the 1996–1999 period, before the foundation of AKP and its consolidation power. Furthermore, investigating the data more closely reveals that a major shift in the conceptualization of democracy occurred after the secularist military intervention in 1997 (dubbed the February 28 intervention), which forced the Islamist-led coalition government to resign. In 1996 and 1997, the frequencies of electoral and liberal definitions of democracy were more or less equal whenever there was a discussion of democracy. The ratio of liberal to electoral conceptualization was 1. In 1998, the ratio increased to 1.8, and to 2.5 and 3.4 in the subsequent two years, and remained around 2 in the remaining years.

This indicates a remarkable transformation of how democracy was viewed by the religious elite. Before 1998, the value of democracy equally stemmed from elections' potential to bring the majority's will upon government and from its liberal

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But the secular elites were divided on this question. Suspicion diminished and faded away in *Milliyet* after the AKP came to power in 2002. By contrast, it grew in *Cumhuriyet* and in 2004 it reached the same level it had in 1997, during the old Islamist party government.

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The secular elites did not find it credible that the Islamists could embrace liberal democracy as an efficient way to pursue their own ends, either. The idea of liberal democracy "as a system facilitating the Islamists' pursuit of their own ends" was discussed 235 times in the secular press, but 72 percent showed disbelief. In the eyes of the secular elites, Islamists could not embrace liberal democracy even for instrumental reasons. Although the civil and political rights and freedoms embedded in liberal democracy provide ample opportunities for Islamists to express their agenda, persuade people and promote their cause, seculars did not see it that way.

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
Importantly, religious-conservative governments increased the seculars' cynicism while making the conservative more optimistic. Seculars rejected the idea that


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...ver, whether or not the secular suspension of the constitution is a sign of general authoritarianism in the relationship vis-à-vis elected government (or a sign of military interference with political life in the Turkish Cumhuriyet). ...diminishes whenever the secularism (33 percent) or sign of the secular press did not see the government of military intervention (government intervention). ...raş... ...ref... ...nyet... ...tical pa... ...the contex... ...vely), wherea... ...Figure 2 show... ...per became more... ...ment was in power. ...ile revealing the secular... ...not necessarily imply that the... ...state interventions against... ...standing popular perceptions... ...the secular papers (41 percent... ...of the February 28 interven... ...higher in the context of Ölib... ...newspapers):<sup>46</sup>





### Religious-Secular Cleavage In The Media?



Religious and secular newspapers are not necessarily different from each other with respect to all subjects. In suspicion of Kurdish nationalism, for example, the religious newspaper *Milli Gazete* is often more similar to a secular newspaper like *Ummurriyet* than to another religious paper like *Kenan Safak*.<sup>47</sup> Likewise, our analyses have showed that there was significant convergence on the overall support for democracy between the religious and secular press. In terms of interest in different subjects, Figure 3 shows the distribution of articles on different subjects in both types of the press. Religious and secular newspapers gave almost equal weight to electoral democracy, liberal democracy, modernization, and social pluralism.


### Secularism Divide

The secular press devoted more space (at least 50 percent more) to secularism, modernization, political pluralism, and nationalism, and the religious-conservative press devoted more space to the Islamic headscarf question, Turkey's urban or rural group identity questions and Muslim grievances, and the West. In terms of normative evaluations, the findings revealed a distinct gap between the two types of newspapers, whenever the discussion was related to religion, secularism, and social pluralism. An example of this is the content of national identity. Figure 4 shows which sources of national identity were highlighted during any discussion pertaining to nationalism. The two types of newspapers gave similar weight to territory (Anatolia or Turkey) in defining national identity. With respect to the relative importance of Islam versus Turkishness, the religious newspapers emphasized the former much more than the other.

The difference between the religious and secular press becomes clearer on the question of secularism. For the religious press, the question of secularism (*laiklik*) was relatively less important (43 codings per newspaper per year, six percent of total codings), the plurality of the codings neutral, and critical codings (34 percent) were considerably more than favorable views (24 percent). By comparison, the secular press was more interested in the secularism question (100 codings per newspaper per year, 11 percent of total codings), and more homogeneous in its religious press: 74 percent of the codings were positive, with only 10 percent being critical.

However, there was a division in the secular press on the question of secularism. Broadly speaking, Kemalism represents the ideal of secular modernization. In the context of a critical evaluation of modernization, however, it denotes authoritarian and religious modernization, and the problems of democratization that are associated with modernization. Kemalism was a mainly negative, undesirable value in the religious press, as Figure 5 illustrates. It was considered a mainly positive value in the secular press. However, while critical views on Kemalism were visible in the religious press, they were absent in *Ummurriyet*.





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
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are weakened by, among other factors, insufficient prior change in the thinking of religious-conservative elites, and distrust of the AKP and EU-cynicism of the secular elite. A full illustration of this argument based on data from the content analysis is presented elsewhere.<sup>50</sup> For example, in July 2009, the AKP government initiated an initiative known as Kurdish or democratic opening aimed to address the Kurdish conflict through negotiations and democratic-political reforms. As of the writing of this article, however, this initiative brought few concrete results and faced significant resistance from the opposition and the government's own constituencies in addition to increased Kurdish separatist violence.

The fact that the AKP government embarked on this bold initiative can be linked with two findings. The liberal political transformation of Turkish Islamism explained above, and the fact that the religious elite are relatively more open to ethnic identity-based politics, which, many religious actors believe, would not cause disintegration thanks to the common religious bond uniting ethnic Turks and Kurds. Accordingly, 'the right of ethnic parties to exist' was approved by 37 percent and disapproved by only 15 percent of the codings in the religious press, compared to 18 and 38 percent respectively in the secular press.

In turn, two types of findings help to explain the resistance to the opening. By itself, openness to identity politics is insufficient to sustain the Kurdish opening. It also requires openness to various concrete reforms such as education in Kurdish or amnesty for Kurdish militants, which continue to be taboo among major segments of Turkish society. Did the religious thinking change, or was it more liberal than the secular thinking, on such questions? The findings indicate neither. Only one exam-



was more open to this idea than the secular papers, *Yeni Safak* was the most favorable (51 percent), followed by pro-secular *Milliyet* (48 percent), *Zaman* (14 percent), pro-secular *Cumhuriyet* (14 percent), and *Milli Gazete* (11 percent). The findings suggest that while the AKP leadership might have felt that the Kurdish opening in order to resolve this long-festering conflict, the conservative elites at large do not seem to have sufficiently supported the opening fully back and sustain its implementation.

Finally, the secular press grew suspicious of the opening's impact on national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and thus provided little support for the opening. One example of this was *Yeni Safak*.

### Conclusion

People who write in the press for the state and the political elite. Significant component of explanation for the current situation is the role of the press thereof.

The Turkish press is caught between its primary public responsibility to inform the citizenry, or its secondary, ideologically biased editorial decisions in response to specific political developments.

These flaws aside, however, one might ask the following question. Given the apparent weakness of self-reflective and pluralistic internal debate within political parties and the parliament, how else could elite thinking change such that the elite develop a more categorical appreciation of pluralistic democracy and new and more

constructive ideas for resolving long-term questions such as secularism, EU relations, and the Kurdish question? Arguably, such change of elite thinking is necessary for the consolidation of a pluralistic democracy with European standards. In this respect, the findings of the systematic and comprehensive content analysis presented in this article shows that the press plays an important role as a public forum for elite discussion. This role of the press needs more attention and conceptualization.

Broadly speaking, the Turkish press seems to fit the image of the polarized-pluralist Mediterranean model. However, when one examines all the views expressed in the press and not just the headlines or the dominant view of each newspaper, the findings reveal that there is much more internal pluralism, discussion and dissent within both religious and secular elites than often perceived. This is true even on issues such as secularism where there is a clear gap of values between religious and secular elites.

The findings also reveal that elites reached considerable consensus over time regarding desirability of pluralistic democracy, if not over how to resolve elite

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Aktürk, Ali, Arkoğlu, Patrick James, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Evangelos Liaras, and John Waterbury for comments; Aykut Arōkan for a reference; and Hande ... Eren, and an excellent group of students in Istanbul and Ankara for research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

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## Notes

1. Other criticisms include oligopolistic ownership with business interests outside the media, weak regulation, job insecurity, and lack of professionalism. Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1996), pp. 109–123. Hasan Cemal, *Cumhuriyet Çok Sevdim: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Öndeki Ölümün perde arkasō* [I Used to Love Cumhuriyet So Much: Behind the Scenes of the Internal War in Cumhuriyet Newspaper] (Istanbul: Doan Kitap, 2003). Beybin Kejanlıca, *Türkiye Öde Medyanın Dönüşümü* [The transformation of the media in Turkey] (Istanbul: mge Kitabevi, 2004). G. Y. İseren Adan, *Türkiye Öde Medya Endüstrisi: Neoliberalizm, aında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol ilişkileri* [Media Industry in Turkey: Ownership and Control Relationships in the Age of Neoliberalism] (Ankara: İtopya Yayınları, 2006). Serhat Kaymas, *ÖDevlet ve Sermaye Sarmalında Türkiye Medyası: Ekonomik Krizler, Medya ve Demokrasi*, Ö [Turkish Media in the Spiral of State and Capital: Economic Crises, Media and Democracy]. İletim: Galatasaray Üniversitesi İletim Fakültesi, Vol. 8 (2008), pp. 77–107.
2. For an earlier example, see Zeynep Alpay cited in Cemal (2005), pp. 119–120.
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7. Tölö (1999). Alper G. Şimşek, "Medya Gücü: Ne olmuştur Ne olmakta," Ö [Media Power: What happened What is happening], *Birikim*, Vol. 234 (2008), pp. 49–51.
8. Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1993), pp. 51–58. Shanto Iyengar, "Agenda Setting and Beyond: Television News and the Strength of Political Issues," Ö in William H. Riker (ed.), *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 211–230. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, *Choices, Values, and Frames* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Donald R. Kinder, "Communication and Opinion," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1988), pp. 167–197. Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

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10. John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. Jeffrey Friedman, "Democratic Competence in Normative and Positive Theory: Neglected Implications of the Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public Opinion," *Critical Review* Vol. 18, Nos 1&3 (2006), pp. i&xliv.
- 5 12. Among 45 countries with a Muslim majority, Turkey ranked in 2005 the 10th highest in terms of GDP per capita but only the 19th in terms of education (UNDP, 2007/2008). The Turkish public's trust in the media is lower than its trust in the armed forces (religious institutions), the legal system, and the political system, but it is higher than its trust in companies, Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basa-ez, and Alejandro Moreno, *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook: Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies; Findings from the 1990&1993 World Value Survey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
- 10 13. Hallin and Mancini (2004).
14. Rodney Benson and Daniel C. Hallin, "How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News: The French and US National Press, 1965&1990," *European Journal of Communication* Vol. 22, No. 1 (2007), pp. 27&48.
- 15 15. The author's interview with the editor of a major religious-conservative newspaper.
- 16 16. Gamze ,avdar, "Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), pp. 486&487. p. 482.
- 17 17. Bek (2004), p. 50.
- 18 18. ermin Tekinalp, "Postmodernist Dördüncü Kuvvet: Kışe Yazarlar," [The Postmodernist Fourth Power: The Newspaper Columnists], *Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 31 (2008), pp. 119&130.
- 20 19. One of the journalists also suggested that there are ideological "insiders" and "outsiders" within each paper and that editorial pressures affected the former more than the latter.
- 20 20. Cumhuriyetis owned by the Cumhuriyet Vakfı (Republic Foundation).
- 21 21. See Daniel C. Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, "Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective," *Media, Culture & Society* Vol. 24, No. 2 (2002), pp. 175&195, for clientelism and media in comparative perspective.
- 25 22. The five papers generated roughly 22 percent of total newspaper circulation in 1996. In 1996, *Vakit* was published under the name *Avak*. The analysis of this newspaper was abandoned after covering one and a half years of its issues, because of too many missing past issues in libraries. It was replaced with *Milli Gazete* after verifying that the results were similar to that of *Vakit*. Insights gained from the partial analysis of *Vakit* contributed to the interpretation of the findings.
- 30 23. Note that the point here is not necessarily about a tradeoff between subjectivity and objectivity. Language is inherently inter-subjective. The difference is in the depth and sophistication of the meaning targeted and in the number of analysts on whose judgments the analysis rests.
- 24 24. See B. Aykut Arökan, M. Deniz Tansi, and Nilüfer Hatemi, *Bilgisayar Destekli Türkçe Tabanlı Medya İçerik İnceleme Sistemi* [Computer Aided and Turkish Based Media Content Analysis System], Project Number 107K209, TUBİTAK, December 2008.
- 35 25. The analysts were instructed to analyze any content (i.e. all articles) in the newspapers that had a link to the 13 subject categories defined. Although advertisements and sports articles were normally excluded, the analysts were instructed to examine them if an article had an explicit reference to one of the subject categories, say, a sports article discussing the rising nationalist fanaticism in sports.
- 40 26. Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, and Amber E. Boydstun, *The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Yoshiko M. Herrera, *Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regional News* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 2004). Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring, "The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity,"



