

**Lemma 1.** Let  $\succeq$  be a distribution-regret preference relation. Then  $\succeq$  admits a two-dimensional regret function  $*: \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{D} \to \Re$  and a regret functional  $V^*$  such that

$$\begin{aligned} X \succeq Y & \iff V^* \Big( \begin{array}{c} *(x_1, c_Y), p_1; \dots; & *(x_n, c_Y), p_n \Big) \ge 0 \\ & \iff V^* \Big( \begin{array}{c} *(y_1, c_X), q_1; \dots; & *(y_m, c_X), q_m \Big) \le 0 \end{aligned}$$

where  $c_X$  and  $c_Y$  are the certainty equivalents of X and Y respectively.

**Definition 4.**  $\dot{}$ 

$$\begin{array}{c} :\mathcal{D}\times\mathcal{D}\to\Re, \\ :\mathcal{V}\to \Re, \\ :\mathcal{V}\to$$



**Proposition 3.** *If the preference relation*  $\succeq$  *is consistent then it satisfies distribution regret.* 

Proof.  $\mathcal{D}$ .  $\mathbf{V}$  $\lambda(Z)$  $(x, c_Y)$  $\lambda(Z) = -c_Z \quad (x, y) = x - y.$  $f(x, \lambda(Y)) \in \mathcal{DN}^*.$  $f(X,\lambda(Y)) = (f(x_1,\lambda(Y)), p_1; \ldots; f(x_n,\lambda(Y)), p_n)$  $= ((x_1, c_Y), p_1; \ldots; (x_n, c_Y), p_n)$  $=\Psi(X,c_Y)$ (4)- $X \succeq Y \sim \delta_{c_Y} \iff f(X, \lambda(Y)) \succeq f(Y, \lambda(Y)) \sim \delta_{f(c_Y, \lambda(Y))} = \delta_0$  $\iff U(f(X,\lambda(Y))) \ge U(f(Y,\lambda(Y))) = U(\delta_0) = 0$ **1**, **†**  $V(\Psi(X, c_Y)) = U(f(X, \lambda(Y))) = U(\Psi(X, c_Y))$  $( \mathbf{r} \mathbf{r} \mathbf{r})$  $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbf{W} \quad (\mathbf{V} \in \mathbf{W}) > 0$ 

$$X \geq I \iff U(\Psi(X, c_Y)) \geq 0$$
$$\iff V(\Psi(X, c_Y)) \geq 0$$
$$\therefore \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \Box$$

$$Z = (z_1, r_1; \dots; z_n, r_n) \qquad z_1 \leq \dots \leq z_n, \quad \dot{f}, \quad \dot{f},$$

Example 3.1 
$$\stackrel{i}{\rightarrow} \geq \stackrel{i}{\downarrow} \stackrel{i}{\downarrow$$

 $\Psi(X', c_{Z'}) = \Psi(X, c_Z) \qquad \Psi(Y', c_{Z'}) = \Psi(Y, c_Z)$  (5)  $Y' \sim Z'. \qquad (5)$   $X', Y', Z' = \overline{Y} = \mathcal{I}.$ 

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$$[X] + \alpha \mu_X^+ = (1+\alpha)\alpha \implies \alpha = \frac{-(1-\mu_X^+) + \sqrt{(1-\mu_X^+)^2 + 4 \ [X]}}{2} \tag{()}$$

$$[X] > 0 \qquad (X < 0) > 0 \implies X > \delta_{[X]} \qquad ()$$

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
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**Proposition 4.** *If the preference relation*  $\succeq$  *satisfies distribution regret with a commutative regret function*, *then it is consistent.* 



## 5. Discussion