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Event Recap

Robert P. George, recently described by the听New York Times Magazine听as 鈥渢he country鈥檚 most influential听conservative-Christian thinker,鈥� presented a talk听entitled 鈥淣atural Law, God and Human Dignity鈥� as the 9^th听Annual Prophetic Voices Lecture on March 25th before a听large crowd in Higgins Hall.

George, the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at听Princeton University, is a leading scholar in the largely听Catholic 鈥渘ew natural law鈥� movement that grounds its听understanding of unchangeable moral principles solely on听the foundation of practical reason. In other words, we can听understand the right thing to do鈥攁nd indeed the moral听principles that make actions right, as well as the 鈥渂asic听goods鈥� that determine the moral principles鈥攂y reflecting on听the nature of our human capacities and the ways in which we听can flourish or languish.

George began his argument with the example of friendship, which he considers an intrinsic, basic human good. Friends act in ways that make sense to us, he said: they give without expectation of receiving, they help one another simply because they are friends and not for future gain. Friendship makes sense to us as humans because we recognize it as a good in itself. We don鈥檛 need any other reasons to explain it; our natural capacity for friendship yields a natural understanding of its merits. Conversely, a purely instrumental friendship鈥攐ne based solely on the likelihood of mutual advancement of individual goals鈥� is not a friendship at all, because it fails to contribute to our well-being as social creatures. When we have true friends, and are true friends to others, we flourish as human beings.

Like friendship, health and the pursuit of intellectual knowledge (in any field of thought) are basic human goods, George argued. We can flourish or languish depending on our actions with respect to any of these intrinsic goods. Among the implications of this argument is that there are numerous basic goods that we should pursue, and that they sometimes come into conflict. This means that 鈥渢he human good is variegated,鈥� not singular. Natural law, George said, helps us to choose among competing moral claims in ways that move us closer to 鈥渋ntegral human fulfillment,鈥� to a balance of human goods that fulfills our human capacity to flourish physically, morally and intellectually.

After explaining his conception of natural law at some length, George discussed its merits over competing ethical theories鈥攑rimarily those like utilitarianism that focus on consequences rather than intrinsic values鈥攁nd spoke in broad terms about the moral implications of his position. The 鈥渕aster moral principle鈥� that natural law highlights is a familiar one, George argued, for it is expressed in such norms as the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you), the Pauline Principle (don鈥檛 do evil even if good might come of it) and Immanuel Kant鈥檚 principle of humanity (treat humanity, whether in the person of yourself or another, always as an end and never as a means only). Using these broad moral principles, we can then derive more specific moral norms that apply to particular cases like adultery or lying in specific situations.

George ended his lecture with remarks on human rights as moral principles. With a nod to Harvard law professor and former Ambassador to the Vatican Mary Ann Glendon (who was present at the lecture), George argued that while rights language is sometimes employed in inappropriate contexts, it is ultimately a 鈥渦seful, supple way of conceiving and expressing the moral principle that guides our action conclusively away from鈥� choices that might otherwise be understood as acceptable. There are other ways to argue for the intrinsic value of human life, including 鈥渢he straightforward language of justice,鈥� he said, but human rights offers a particularly powerful and important form of argument. On this point, the audience was in complete agreement.